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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
~-,LORA S. ~lEClL-\~1, et al,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

I

vs.

Case No.
7865

ARTHUR R. ALLEN, J. H. ALLEN, )'
et al,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR RE-HEARING
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

COMES NOW, ARTHUR R. ALLEN and J. H.
ALLEN, appellants herein and respectfully petition the
Honorable Court for a re-hearing and re-argument in
the above entitled action. This Petition is based on the
grounds that this Honorable Court erred in its finding
that the Trial Court's Instruction Number 11, though
clearly erroneous, was not prejudicial error, such ruling
being contrary to the holding of this court in Ryan vs.
Union Pacific Railway Company, 46 Utah 530, 151 P.
71, and such ruling ignoring the presumption that such
an error in instructions is prejudicial.
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WHEREFORE, Appellants, Petitioners, herein,
pray that the judgment of the Court be re-examined and
a re-hearing and re-argument be permitted of the above
entitled case. A Brief in support of this Petition is filed
herewith.

_________ ]JJM.W_,~-~------------PETER W. BILLINGS
Attorney for Appellants and
Petitioners

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
PETER W. BILLINGS, hereby certifies that he is
one of the Attorneys for the Appellants and Petitioners
herein, that he is familiar with the facts and issues raised
on the Appeal and the issues raised by the foregoing
Petition for re-hearing and further certifies that in his
opinion there is good cause to believe that the decision
objected to is erroneous and that the case ought to be
re-examined and re-argued as prayed for in said Petition and that said Petition is filed in good faith and not
for the purpose of delay.

Dated this

---------~=>-:::~~~~-~~;;:::.:.~~---····

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR RE-HEARING
The facts are stated fully in Appellants' Brief on
Appeal. One of the issues raised in such brief was the
error of the trial court in instructing the jury as to the
presumption of due care on the part of the decedent,
2
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Thmnas Udell .l\lechan1. 'fhe opinion of the court agrees
with Appellants' contention that such instruction was
erroneous but a majority of the court felt that it was
not prejudicial without citing or referring to Ryan vs.
Union Pacific Railzcay Company, supra, which had previously held such an instruction to be clearly prejudicial
and without following the well-established rule that such
an error in an instructi?n is presumed to be prejudicial.
For those reasons, it is submitted that this court
should grant the Petition for re-hearing, to re-consider
its opinion and hear further argument on the issue of
presumption of due care on the part of the decedent.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
THE ERRORS IN INSTRUCTION NO. 11 ARE PRESUMED TO BE PREJUDICIAL.
I.

II. THE ERRORS IN INSTRUCTION NO. 11 WERE
CLEARLY PREJUDICIAL.

ARGUMENT
I. THE ERRORS IN INSTRUCTION NO. 11 ARE PRESUMED TO BE PREJUDICIAL.

It is a long established principle of judicial review
that an erroneous charge to the jury is error which is
calculated to do harm and in such case, prejudice will
be presumed until, by the record, it is shown that error
was not or could not have been harmful; Littledyke vs.
Wood, 69 Utah 323, 255 P 172, and an instruction which
is equivocable and capable of being interpreted correctly
or incorrectly, will be deemed prejudicial until, by the
record, it is demonstrated that it would or could have
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done no harm. Grow vs. Oregon Short Litne, 47 Utah 26,
150 P 970. Thus, as said by this court in Jenson vs. Utah
Railway Co., 72 Utah 366,270 P 349 at page .362:
"However, where the committed error is of
such nature or character as calculated to do harm,
or on its face as having the natural tendency to do
so, prejudice will be presun1ed, until by the record
it is affirmatively shown that the error was not
or could not have been of harmful effect. 'l1hus,
if the appellant shows committed error of such
nature or character, he, in the first instance, has
made a prima facie showing of prejudice. 'rhe
burden, or rather the duty of going forward, is
then cast on the respondent to show by the record
that the con1mitted error was not, or could not
have been, of harmful effect. State v. Cluff, 48
Utah 102, 158 P. 701; Jackson, Stone, et al. v.
~-,eather River & Gibsonville Water Co., 14 Cal.
19; Thelin v. Stewart, 100 Cal. 372, 34 P. 861; 2
Hayne, New rr,rial and Appeal (2d Ed.) pp. 16081614."
It is submitted that there is nothing in this record
which can meet that presumption, but on the contrary,
the nature of the erroneous instruction and the issue
which it points up, clearly reinforce the presumption that
the error was prejudicial.
A.s stated by this court in the recent case of State
v. Hendricks, 258 P 2d 452 :
"1,he fact that elsewhere in the instructions
the jury were correctly instructed on the presumption of innocence does not cure the instant
error. Although the instructions are to be considered as a whole, where they are in irreconcilable conflict, they could but confuse or mislead the
jury."
4
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II. THE ERRORS IN INSTRUCrl'ION NO. 11 WERE
CLEARLY PREJUDICIAL.

This is the second case in two years in which this
court has found the giving of an instruction concerning
the presumption of due care on the part of a decedent
in a wrongful death case to be error. See Tuttle vs.
P.l.E., 242 P 2d 764. This is also the second time in two
years that this court has held that such error is not
prejudicial. With such judicial backing it will now be
standard operating procedure for attorneys in wrongful
death cases to submit and get such an instruction. So a
jury in such a case will have effectively eleminated from
the possibilities before it, in a close case as to the cause
of an accident, the conclusion that neither party was to
blame, see, e.g., Gibbs vs. Blue Cab, 249 P 2d 213, as the
presumption will be riding in the car with the plaintiff;
so that instead of the plaintiff having to prove that the
accident was due to the negligence of the defendant, the
defendant will have to prove that the accident was due to
the contributory negligence or sole negligence of the
plaintiff's decedent. With the presumption before the
jury, the dead center "out" afforded by our common law
rules of placing the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff is gone.
In Tuttle vs. P.l.E., supra, the giving of the instruc.,
tion as to the presumption was not deemed prejudicial
as it merely stated to the jury that, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the presumption of due care
on the part of the decedent exists and, although there
was such evidence to the contrary, the jury was deemed
5
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intelligent enough to realize that it was mere surplusage
and to look at the "blanket" rather than the "handkerchief". In the case at bar the opinion of the court has
stated: "It was error for the court to instruct the jury
on that question * * * If the instructionon the presumption accurately stated the law and the jury correctly understood it there could be no prejudice. But
here there were a number of incorrect statements of the
law on presumptions and so we n1ust analyze them to
detennine whether defendants were prejudiced thereby."
We submit that the opinion of the court is correct in
stating that there were a number of erroneous statements
of law in the instruction, but that the court is engaging
in sheer speculation and perhaps wishful thinking in
concluding that the jury correctly understood the instruction even though it incorrectly stated the law.
The first error in the instruction was the use of the
phrase "Until the contrary is proven." The opinion of
the court recognizes that the jury might well have understood the phrase to mean that this placed on the defendant the burden of persuasion that decedent Mecham was
negligent which negligence proximately caused the accident, but argues that this is not prejudicial as defendant
had the burden of proof of contributory negligence in
any event. That is true, but that argument overlooks
the fact that plaintiff is supposed to have the burden of
proving that the accident was caused by the negligence
of defendant and of over-coming the middle ground of
"neither to blame." Defendants normally need not have
to prove negligence of the plaintiff to escape liability,
6
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but here the jury is told that the decedent is presumed
not to be negligent until the contrary is proven, so that
defendant starts with the scales tilted in the direction
of his responsibility.
This raises the second basic error of the instruction
in the case at bar. The jury was told the presumption
was to be considered with all the other facts in evidence
in determining whether the decedent was negligent. So
that in addition to starting with a presumption that the
decedent is not negligent, which as the opinion of the
court admits is not the law, the defendant ends up with
the scale still tilted by that imponderable presumption.
'fhere is no question but that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found
that Thomas Mecham was negligent and his negligence
contributed to or caused the fatal accident. It is a close
case as to which car was on the wrong side of the center
line or whether both were over the line. How can this
court, or counsel for either party, at this time, speculate
whether the presence of that imponderable presumption
in weighing the evidence tipped the scales in favor of the
plaintiff or whether the jury ~erely understood that
the trial court was commenting on the evidence or the
evidentiary value of man's instinct for self preservation.
And if it be considered as mere comment on the
evidentiary value of man's instinct, that alone is prejudicial error. State vs. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P 2d 177.
The opinion of the court, while giving lip service to the
approach of Professor Morgan in his comments on the
"Model Code of Evidence" and his law review articles
7
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on the subject of presumptions, by holding this instruction to be not prejudicial effectively nullifies Morgan's
approach as to the purpose of presumptions and overrules, without even lip service, the case of Ryan vs. U.P.
Bailway Comparny, 46 Utah 530, 151 P 71, cited in Appellant's brief. In the Ryan case this court held to be
prejudicial error an instruction in a death case reading
as follows:
"You are instructed that the instinct of self
preservation and the disposition of men to avoid
personal harm reenforce an inference that a person killed or injured was in the exercise of ordinary care, and that the natural instinct which
leads men in their sober senses to avoid injury
and preserve life is an element of evidence to be
considered in connection with the other testimony
in this case."
In that case the word "presumption" and all the inferences it conjures in the lay mind as well as the confusion
it has wrought in legal circles was not even used. Certainly, if that instruction is prejudicial error without
even the bad word "presumption", as this court held, the
instruction in the case at bar is more, not less prejudicial.
If Ryan vs. U.P. Railway Co., supra, and In reNewell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P 2d 230, are to be reversed
and defendants in wrongful death cases are to be saddled
with the job of righting the scales tipped in favor of the
plaintiff by a presumption that the decedent was acting
in due care and with the task of meeting an instruction
to the jury that it is to consider that presumption that
decedents act carefully but survivors do not in arriving
8
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at a verdict as to causation, it is respectfully requested
that those cases be reversed in the full light of day and
not ignored by the shadow of "error but no harm done."
If the instruction ratified by this court in its opinion
be submitted in a case where the alleged wrongdoer is
a decedent, as now authorized by Chapter 30, Laws of
Utah 1953, will not surviving plaintiffs be clamouring
that they have to prove not only by a preponderance of
evidence that the decedent was negligent, but overcome
an ever-present presumption that he was not 1 It is submitted that no matter how carefully a court may delineate
to a jury the respective burdens which the law imposes
upon plaintiffs and defendants as to negligence, causation and contributory negligence, to load the charge with
a "presumption" which the jury shall consider along
with the evidence, not only confuses the jury, but creates
an inference in the jury's mind that the court, while trying to state fairly the obligations and burdens of proof
which each party has to meet, really thinks that the one
in whose favor the court gives that presumption is the
one who is in the right and that the jury had better think
so too.
Attorneys and judges do not serve on juries and
can only speculate as to what goes on in jurors' minds
in considering the legal "mumbo jumbo" of the multitude
of instructions which are handed to them. But it is submitted that it is grievous error to let a party's rights,
duties and obligations rest on speculation whether the
jury properly understand an instruction which even
lawyers and learned judges have difficulty in construing.
9
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CONCLUSION
It is submitted that it is hardly harmless error to a
farmer who, as the record shows, must bear this judgment out of his own pocket and lose his life's accumulations, to be told that a jury rendered a verdict against
him of $45,000.00, based on an erroneous instruction as
to the law. If our faith in the jury system is to be maintained, it must rest in the belief that the jury will be
led down the correct path of the law and not left to sort
out the proper law from a mixture of clearly erroneous
instructions. If there is to be any presumption indulged
in on the basis of man's experience, it would be that a
jury of laymen would be unable to do so.
Respectfully submitted,

PETER W. BILLINGS,
Attorney for Appellants
a;nd Petitioners.
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